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The focus of this thesis will be on the policy implications surrounding the mandated transition 
from the London Interbank Offered Rate to Secured Overnight Financing Rate. This discussion 
will begin by explaining the genesis of the LIBOR in the development of the Eurodollar market. 
Next, this paper will present the LIBOR manipulation scandal and the effects on the financial 
system. An analysis of the differences between SOFR and LIBOR will provide the basis of an 
assessment of the impact of the change on financial institutions. Finally, the effectiveness of the 
SOFR as a benchmark will be evaluated, along with the changes banks need to make to conform 
to this new economic standard. In the end, this study concludes that there are better options than 
the proposed SOFR benchmark. These alternative options will facilitate more responsible 
growth for financial products that are pegged to benchmark rates.    
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The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is a benchmark rate based on the average 
of selected interest rates at which many international banks lend money to one another. 
Abbreviated as LIBOR, it was initially instituted by banks operating in the Eurodollar market. 
However, since its inception the LIBOR rate has come to be used more broadly as a reference or 
benchmark rate on a variety of products that range from adjustable-rate mortgages, home equity 
loans, lines of credit, auto loans, student loans, and credit cards. Thus, LIBOR has a key role in 
many types of financial securities, in particular those with adjustable or floating interest rates. 
Rather than having fixed coupon payments, the adjustable rates on these investments are linked 
to a short-term reference rate, usually the three-month LIBOR, plus a spread. The spread is 
compensation for the counterparty risks.    
Eurodollars are bank funds denominated in U.S currency but are not subject to U.S 
financial regulations (Sundaresan 2009). Typically, these funds are mediated by institutions 
located outside the United States which exempts them from U.S regulation. The Eurodollar 
market can be characterized as an interbank market where financial institutions borrow and lend 
to one another. LIBOR was created as a benchmark to reflect the rate at which banks offer 
Eurodollar loans to one another. As one of the largest financial markets in which all major 
financial institutions participate, it has accompanied the tremendous growth in world trade and 
investment, as well as financial innovations such as interest rate swaps, Eurodollar futures, and 
other derivative contracts (Dufey, Giddy 1978). These transactions also all use the LIBOR as 
their main reference rate.  
While the Eurodollar market offers financial flexibility that augments revenue 
generation, the absence of prudential regulation makes it a catalyst for instability. A full 
regulation would require more effective monitoring, compliance, and enforcement mechanisms 
adhered to by all banks. As a result of the lack of regulation, banks have increasingly attempted 
to manipulate their LIBOR submissions to benefit the performance of their own and clients’ 
investment portfolios. These abuses became evident during the investigations of the causes of 
the recent financial crisis and U.S policymakers decided that it was in the best interest of 
financial system stability to eliminate the use of LIBOR completely and to institute a new 
benchmark rate called the SOFR. Over the past couple years, the LIBOR has slowly been 
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phased out. Many short-term floating-rate investments have been issued with LIBOR, with the 
intention to completely replace it in 2023.  
The effects of phasing out such a long-standing benchmark rate are unpredictable. Each 
investment, security, or loan whose performance is tied to the LIBOR reference rate has its own 
contractual conditions. Unless a back-up rate is listed in a prospectus or contract, the new rate 
and terms will need to be agreed upon between the borrowers and lenders. The good news is 
many LIBOR related investments tend to be short term in nature and should mature before the 
transition to the SOFR is made. While many of these investments may simply mature before the 
phase-out occurs, there are still a number of long-term contracts that still reference LIBOR and 
whose outlook is more uncertain. A switch to a new reference rate can have an impact on the 
spreads and the valuations of these floating-rate investments creating stability issues for global 
markets.  
There are numerous legal and operational risks that come with moving various contracts 
over to a new benchmark. In a worst-case scenario, the implementation of a new rate could lead 
to a complete capital market failure which would adversely affect banks’ balance sheets and 
possibly cause solvency issues depending on exposures in the market. For example, when a 
corporation issues an investment vehicle tied to SOFR, older investments that are still tied to 
LIBOR may be less desirable and could potentially experience a loss of liquidity once LIBOR is 
officially retired. In addition, if the switch to the SOFR lowers liquidity, creating a large gap 
between what a security, such as bond, can be bought or sold for, it will instantly increase the 
overall price volatility in the market. Hence, one of the focuses of this discussion will be on how 
global monetary and fiscal authorities should regulate the contracts that banks enter that are set 
to transition to the SOFR.   
The first part of this paper will provide a critical evaluation of how the lack of 
regulations within the markets gave rise to LIBOR manipulation, creating financial instability. 
The second part of the thesis will contain a critical evaluation of whether the SOFR can serve as 
an adequate replacement for the LIBOR, in terms of financial instruments and financial stability. 
Lastly, this discussion will conclude by analyzing whether replacing the LIBOR with the SOFR 
is the most effective regulatory policy, in terms of preventing financial instability, and offer 
alternatives to the current plan the Federal Reserve has proposed.      




Chapter 1: The Unregulated Growth of Euro Markets  
London developed geographically as the financial center for the Eurodollar market, but 
the institutions that operated within these markets did so outside the regulatory authority of the 
United Kingdom. In other words, the Eurodollar market existed outside traditional regulated 
markets of national financial centers. This market quickly expanded across Europe and even 
into parts of Asia. By the mid-1970s, the Eurodollar market became larger than most domestic 
financial centers. The precipitous growth of Eurodollar transactions a can be attributed to U.S. 
balance of payments deficits, international interest rate differentials, plan uncertainly, and 
foreign financial relationships (Dufey, Giddy 1978).   
Within the Eurodollar market, currency is exchanged directly between lenders and 
borrowers. A reporting area bank (say in Germany) may obtain domestic currency which it 
switches into a foreign currency and then deposits in the Eurocurrency markets in another 
reporting area bank (say in London). Similarly, “a German bank could borrow dollars from a 
London bank and then switch into the domestic currency and lend it in the German domestic 
market. The volume of such swapped positions is estimated by the BIS and included in their 
'net' concept” (Macmillian 1989). Financial institutions also borrow or lend domestic currency 
to a reporting bank in another country on behalf of domestic customers (Macmillian 1989).   
Beginning in 1970, numerous governments and corporations both borrowed Eurodollar 
deposits from banks and started issuing securities in Eurodollars at rates that were lower than 
domestic borrowing rates. They were able to do this because the Eurodollar market gave 
financial participants, the ability to avoid onerous prudential banking regulations (Ojo 2014). 
Essentially, banks were able to avoid the restrictions that existed in traditional financial centers 
and saw increased profits through domestic currency swaps and third-party lending. The 
advantage of operating within the Eurodollar market was the easy access to cheap funds for 
borrowers. However, at the same time, the market was subject to financial instability as parties 
often entered contracts where the borrowers' sources of income were not steady (Huan, Previtis, 
Parbonetti, 2015). 
 Outside of the sphere of the Eurodollar market, this type of instability, in most cases, 
can be alleviated when both domestic and international financial authorities exercise an 
oversight role on banking operations. The combination of the two authorities creates a situation 
where interbank mechanisms are able to channel funds from initial depositors to borrowers with 
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limited risk. However, in the Eurodollar market, the interbank mechanism can multiply risks, 
because this market accounts for most of the the participating banks' liabilities (Macmillian 
1989).  To put this into perspective, in U.S. domestic markets, the Federal Funds interbank 
mechanism accounts for only 12.5% of the aggregate liabilities of U.S. banks while the 
Eurodollar market interbank mechanism used to contain 70% of its bank’s aggregate liabilities 
(Macmillan 1989). The existence of such a large interbank market allowed banks to match the 
inflow and outflow of funds from deposits and loans by lending excess funds or borrowing to 
meet lending commitments. This reduced the need to maintain a stock of liquid assets which 
would act as a safety margin.  
The interbank mechanism within the Eurodollar market performs a necessary and 
valuable role in linking non-bank depositors and lenders in different parts of the world 
(Macmillian 1989).  Moreover, the interbank mechanism is key to the overall efficiency of the 
Eurodollar market system as this mechanism gives member banks the ability to access funds 
with relative ease. Specifically, it allows them to acquire and place funds in the market for short 
periods to earn interest, while also reducing transaction and information costs, thus, allowing 
them to operate on smaller margins (Macmillian 1989). With that being said, the increased 
dependence banks have on the interbank system, along with the fact the majority of their debt is 
pooled together in this market, also increases the speed at which crises might spread through the 
system.  
 The movement to the Eurodollar market can be considered an original model of the free 
enterprise global financial system, as it marked the beginning of an exodus away from the 
restrictions placed by the United States on international capital. In fact, the development of the 
Eurodollar market can be characterized as a movement fueled by liberal internationalism and a 
laissez-faire mandate of private and central bankers.  
 
Interest Rate Swaps and Financial Securitization:    
As the Eurodollar market grew, it created numerous arbitrage opportunities for financial 
intermediaries. Specifically, banks began to use the Eurodollar market to trade various 
derivative products, such as Interest Rate Swaps. An Interest Rate Swap can be defined as a 
contractual agreement between two financial parties to exchange interest payments on different 
contractual liabilities with the same principal amount. However, this principal amount is not 
subject to exchange. Instead, parties agree to pay each other interest that would be due on the 
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principal as if the underlying securities were bought and sold (Bradford 1986). Interest Rate 
Swaps have two forms of payment streams associated with them: a floating interest rate, and a 
fixed interest rate. 
In order to illustrate how interest rate swaps function in the Eurodollar market, consider 
two financial entities, Firm 1 and Firm 2, that purchase this type of swap. For the sake of the 
example, Firm 1 will be making floating payments while Firm 2 will be making fixed payments. 
In a situation where no other trades occur in the secondary market interest rate swaps require 
Firm 1 to make a floating payment to Firm 2 for a set amount of time, while Firm 2 makes a 
fixed payment to Firm 1. Simply put, this means if Firm 1 issued a $23 million floating rate 
bond that Firm 2 purchased, Firm 2 would also issue a bond with a fixed rate of the same value. 
The valuation of the swap is simply determined by the spread between the fixed and floating 
rates (Cornell 1986). In terms of its relation to LIBOR, the interest payments stream is tied to 
the LIBOR benchmark as a short-term money market rate and adjusted as the market evolves. 
However, the pricing of these swaps does vary overtime and during the LIBOR crisis these 
prices experienced substantial volatility.  
 Banks who offered to negotiate Interest Rate Swaps for clients had presented them as 
risk-free. In other words, the payments exchanged in an Interest Rate Swap would be identical 
to the payouts from investment of the principal. Despite these arguments, Interest Rate Swaps 
are not immune to volatility, mostly because actual interest rate movements do not always 
match the expectations of the parties involved. Simply put, the counterparty receiving the fixed 
income stream profits if interest rates fall, while the counterparty paying the fixed interest rate 
profits if rates rise (PIMCO 2020). Hence, the entire transaction is based on speculation as 
neither counter party is certain how interest rates will change. Interest Rate Swaps are also 
subject to the counterparty’s credit risk as there is the possibility that the other institution named 
in the contract will default on its obligation.  
By the mid-1980s, the Interest Rate Swap market had grown to a point where a financial 
benchmark was needed (Huan, Previtis, Parbonetti, 2015) because they were becoming 
extremely attractive because of the low transaction and information costs associated with them 
(Sundaresan 2009). UK financial authorities ordered the British Bankers Association (BBA) to 
develop a mechanism that could quantify the interbank lending, trades, and contractual 
obligations that occurred within the Eurodollar market. The BBA called this rate, LIBOR, and it 
quickly became the main benchmark rate for short term floating contracts. As the LIBOR grew 
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in significance, it amassed outstanding values up to at least $300 trillion dollar, approximately 
four and half times the global GDP (Huan, Previtis, Parbonetti, 2015).  Moreover, as financial 
innovation expanded the use of derivative products the LIBOR was subsequently adopted as the 
main benchmark rate for these financial contracts. With such a large amount of interrelated 
funds tied to this one rate, any economic instability with LIBOR pegged contracts would have a 
massive impact on the global economy. Hence, the LIBOR became not only a performance 
measure for funding costs and investment returns, but also an indicator of global economic 
stability.  
 
The Creation of the LIBOR:   
Due to the increase of financial volume and innovation brought on by the expansion of 
the Eurodollar market, a benchmark rate was required to track the valuation of different 
financial transactions and positions. Original forms of this benchmark rate can be attributed to a 
Greek Banker named Minos Zombankis, who proposed the creation of such a rate, by 
arranging syndicated loans amounting to $80 million dollars from Manufacturers Hanover to be 
given to the Shah of Iran (Huan, Previtis, Parbonetti, 2015). The funding costs for this $80 
million dollar loan would come from a set of reference banks.   
Eventually, the LIBOR was created to provide a benchmark for the Eurodollar market.  
The acronym stands for the London Interbank Offer Rate as the rate is set in London and tracks 
the costs of borrowing of 16 main member banks for their best (least risky) counterparties. In 
other words, the LIBOR tracks the rate at which banks offer loans to other member banks that 
operate with this financial benchmark (Sundaresan 2009).  Moreover, banks also peg their 
positions in the market to the LIBOR rate to track their profitability. Prior to the LIBOR crisis, 
the British Bankers Association (BBA) determined the LIBOR by averaging the interbank 
borrowing rate of select member banks in each major currency. Since it is an average, in a 
situation where a crisis occurs and credit risks increase, the LIBOR would increase, as financial 
participants would require high compensation for undertaking riskier debt. In addit ion, the 
LIBOR benchmark allows banks to earn income on rate spreads. Therefore, the calculation of an 
offer rate requires LIBOR member banks to evaluate their own borrowing costs for specific 
currencies and maturities. Once the submissions are collected, the BBA would then trim the 
rates by removing the top and bottom 25 percent and then average the remainder in order to 
derive the final LIBOR rates which are made available to the public (Huan, Previtis, Parbonetti, 
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2015). By the end of the year 1986 the BBA had full control over LIBOR. Major banks would 
submit their borrowing costs to the BBA who would calculate the rate and publish it each 
business day for public consumption (Huan, Previtis, Parbonetti, 2015).   
Before LIBOR manipulation was discovered, instability began to rise for contracts 
pegged to this benchmark rate. This was evident from analyzing the spreads between the LIBOR 
and the Eurodollar Bid Rate.1 Through most of the history of the LIBOR, the Eurodollar Bid 
rate has often had a historically tight relationship with the LIBOR as banks usually submitted 
their cost of borrowing six to twelve basis points above the Eurodollar Bid rate (Snider, Youle, 
2010). However, the instability that arose from this LIBOR system made this relationship 
collapse between the LIBOR and the Eurodollar Bid Rate.  
 
 
The table shows that prior to the crisis banks were merely observing the preceding days 
Eurodollar Bid Rate and were adding it to the fixed spread for their LIBOR submission, rather 
than rigorously evaluating their respective credit risks (Snider, Youle, 2010).  This damaged the 
integrity of the LIBOR and, as a result, financial participants were led to believe credit risk was 
lower than in reality.   
                                                        
1 The Eurodollar Bid Rate is a market rate for Eurodollar deposits.  
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The lack of regulation for LIBOR bench-marked contracts created an incentive for banks 
to manipulate the benchmark to enhance the value of their own proprietary and market-making 
positions. Crisis was inevitable as unregulated banks increasingly participated in risky behavior 
which led to destabilizing effects throughout the entire global economy. The next chapter will 
cover the details of the crisis, by outlining the risky practices money managers, traders, and 
corporate leaders undertook which eventually led to the decline of the LIBOR benchmark. 
Moreover, it will outline the failures of the regulatory agencies tasked to monitor the practices 
of banks that had securities pegged to the LIBOR. Lastly, this chapter will detail the post 
scandal effects along with alternative benchmarks that have been suggested in terms of 
reforming LIBOR.   
 
Chapter 2: The LIBOR Manipulation Crisis   
In the financial period after the Great Financial Crisis, numerous outside agencies 
investigated suggestions that LIBOR submissions had been manipulation to benefit the 
submitting banks against their clients. LIBOR rates uncharacteristically did not spike in relation 
to the Fed Funds rate after many major investment banks became insolvent. (Brill 2020, 2). 
While the BBA denied that information based on the LIBOR was being manipulated, it 
nonetheless undertook an extensive review of the reporting methods. This prompted 
investigations by the Wall Street Journal, Britain’s Financial Services Authority, the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and other parties in the subsequent years. Prior to the 
inception of the crisis, financial participants operated under the assumption that the interbank 
lending market was thriving. The Great Financial Crisis exposed the fact that LIBOR’s 
prominence in derivatives markets had given way to a clear complacency to guard against risk 
because those banks contributing to each day’s report had securities positions that whose value 
would be affected by LIBOR’s movements over time (Yu 2013, 1281).  
Moreover, given the fact that LIBOR’s reports are attributed to member bank balance 
sheet conditions such as liquidity access and credit risk, LIBOR movements can easily affect the 
perception of the credit worthiness of the institutions making the submissions. During the 
financial crisis banks had the incentive to underreport their true borrowing costs to not only 
influence their security positions, but also to maintain investor confidence. Banks did not want 
investors to think they had difficulty raising funds due to market’s perception of the risks they 
faced. Although this incentive for manipulation has received less public attention than the 
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traders’ explicit wrongdoings, its ultimate effect on LIBOR during the financial crisis is likely 
the larger of the two. This is because all banks underreported their cost of borrowing, to some 
extent, throughout the financial crisis whereas the trader’s rate fixing practices likely did not last 
as long and offset each other at times. This problem was made worse by the fact that interbank 
lending largely disappeared during the financial crisis, making it more difficult for regulators to 
reference market transactions to determine the extent to which banks were being truthful in their 
LIBOR submissions (Brill 2020).  
 Due to the self-reporting nature of the LIBOR, banks could easily manipulate the rate to 
increase profitability or presence in the market.  There are two main ways in which member 
banks could manipulate LIBOR to influence their performance. First, during the crisis in order 
to benefit from higher profits on their LIBOR-related products banks would manipulate rates by 
aligning their submission with their individual market positions or collude with other banks with 
similar positions and profit from their LIBOR-related positions (Gandhi 2016).  Banks would 
thus manipulate their rate submissions to help increase their profitability by analyzing their 
position in the market and those of competitors to align their submissions with their respective 
market exposures. By submitting their reports based on their respective market positions, 
financial institutions would be able to benefit their shareholders through higher bank valuations, 
while their own traders and managers would benefit through increased pay and bonuses (Gandhi 
2016). This type of manipulation was mostly performed by banks who owned currency-maturity 
pairs and traded high volumes of interest rate derivatives.  
 Banks could also manipulate their LIBOR submission to alter their credit riskiness. 
Member banks' submissions are supposed to reflect their offers to their best clients and thus also 
reflect their funding costs. This allows other economic agents in the market to infer individual 
bank riskiness from their LIBOR submissions. A bank with a high submission relative to other 
member banks would indicate that lenders to the institution believe it has higher risk. Banks 
with higher credit risks have lower valuations and increase the need to have a source of 
collateral from other sources in case the bank defaults. Therefore, LIBOR member banks have 
the incentive to report submissions that underestimate their true lending offers in order to 
maintain their image of financial stability. This type of manipulation was frequent among 
LIBOR member banks and most regulatory agencies were aware of this fraudulent behavior 
(Kregel 2012). During the Great Financial Crisis (GFC), most market participants knew that 
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most banks were underestimating their risk profile which is why most financial authorities made 
them take government bailout money.  
When LIBOR manipulation became apparent, many private and public regulatory 
agencies investigated the institutions who were supposed to be monitoring and reporting the rate 
to market participants. The most famous case regarding the illegal activity surrounding the 
LIBOR was Barclays, as the trial exposed the discrete fraudulent behaviors that bankers who 
worked for the company were undertaking. At Barclays, bankers who worked for the internal 
derivative trading desk, put pressure on the bank’s money market desk to report rates to the 
BBA that would benefit the bank’s derivative positions (Yu 2013). This practice was not just 
limited to Barclays as numerous LIBOR related banks were responsible for misreporting the 
cost of their debt based on the request of their derivatives traders, who were trying to manipulate 
the market to have a favorable effect on their trading positions. The Barclays case also brought 
to light the collusion that existed amongst banks in “trading circles”, as traders from different 
banks collaborated to fix the LIBOR to make the benchmark favorable to their market positions.  
Last, upper management manipulated their institution’s risk profile in order to disguise 
their lack of creditworthiness (Yu 2013). Member banks, such as Barclays, were suffering from 
solvency problems because of the lack of interbank lending in the short-term money markets. 
Banks were dependent on these markets to replenish short-term capital which was needed in 
order to run their daily operations. If Barclays made a submission reflecting their actual 
underlying cost of borrowing to the BBA, it would have caused alarm to their investors who 
would demand a higher interest to cover the increased risk which Barclays did not want to pay.  
It is easy to blame the banks for the instability and the fraudulent behavior that arose 
surrounding LIBOR, but the regulators are also equally responsible for letting this scandal 
occur.  The lack of oversight by the BBA among other regulatory bodies allowed LIBOR 
member banks to essentially self-regulate themselves causing inevitable corrupt practices to 
become ingrained throughout the system. Overall, there was a lack of accountability and 
transparency between the regulators and the banks, creating a situation where financial 
instability was allowed to grow unchecked through the economic system.  
Prior to the turn of the century the Bank of England was the main economic regulatory 
agency in England. Their relationship with their member banks was very informal (Hall 2013). 
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The hesitancy of the Bank of England to take quick action essentially set the precedent for the 
self-regulatory nature of the LIBOR. When the FSA (Financial Service Authority) was 
established, it took overregulating the LIBOR benchmark from the Bank of England. Unlike the 
Bank of England, the FSA consists of a Treasury-appointed board that is governed by an 
executive chairman. It is actually funded by the banks that it is supposed to regulate (Hall 2013). 
Prior to the LIBOR scandal, FSA officials proudly touted their laissez-faire approach to 
economic regulation which essentially set the stage for systemic destabilization to 
occur.  Economic agents had no financial constraints and had the freedom to participate in any 
market-based activities. When volatility began to arise in the markets, due to banks fraudulent 
activities, many regulatory members refused to acknowledge the existence of a speculative 
excess. The only aspect that they did acknowledge was that there were stability issues within the 
asset markets but claimed their role was not to overrule the views of millions of financial market 
participants, even if they were engaging in speculative behavior (Mitchell, Wray, Watts, 2019).  
While financial regulators became a scapegoat for the LIBOR scandal as their lack of 
oversight provided an avenue for banks to participate in speculative activities, upper 
management as well as traders who work at LIBOR member banks evaded the majority of the 
blame. The reason for this discrepancy derives from a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
LIBOR scandal. Traders and bank leaders primarily participated in two types of manipulation of 
the LIBOR mentioned above in two different economic periods. Prior to the LIBOR scandal, 
individual traders were designing their submissions to gross higher profits. Upper 
management seemed to have knowledge of their employees rigging their LIBOR submissions, 
in terms of fixing the rates for increased profitability. However, regulators were unaware of the 
fraudulent nature of the individual traders at these banks, thus could not put a stop to their 
corrupt behavior. Meanwhile, the manipulation that occurred during the GFC was based on the 
major bank’s responses to the economic collapse of short-term money markets (Kregel 
2012).  Banks wanted to maintain an aura of stability, so they were submitting rates that were 
not accurate in terms of their cost of borrowing. The upper management of most banks was 
actively participating in rigging their submissions to skew their credit risk.  When the system 
crashed big banks were hardly criticized for their role, while regulators were forced to take 
responsibility for the LIBOR scandal, as according to the public these organizations should have 
been more involved in daily banking operations to prevent these fraudulent practices from 
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occurring. The public response to the crisis incorrectly assumed that regulators were aware of 
both types of fraudulent behavior where in reality, regulatory agencies were only aware that 
LIBOR submissions were being reported inaccurately. This misrepresentation unfairly shifted 
the blame towards the regulators, while somewhat absolving the upper management of the 
member banks, who knew about and participated in both types of manipulation.   
After the financial crisis, Barclays was a prominent concern for the Bank of England 
because it had opted not to accept the bailout money that most major banks were accepting due 
to solvency issues. However, this was not an indicator that Barclays was performing well since 
Barclays had no measures to respond to the crisis in money markets. The Bank of England’s 
solution was to focus on their LIBOR submissions because it provided an indication of their risk 
profile (Kregel 2012). During the crisis, Barclays’ rate submissions had been higher than those 
of other banks, which had caught the attention of the Bank of England that there might be 
funding issues at the institution. Hence, the Bank of England decided to investigate whether 
upper management was aware that their submissions were higher than market LIBOR 
submissions. Barclays upper management responded that the reason their LIBOR submissions 
were higher than the rest of the market is because the other member banks were manipulating 
the rates in their own favor. When the Bank of England proclaimed that they did not know that 
LIBOR rate manipulation was occurring, the public thought they were completely unaware of 
the submitting banks fraudulent activities (Kregel 2012).  Most people did not differentiate 
between the LIBOR rate manipulation traders were doing and the fraudulent nature that the 
upper management of member banks were performing (Kregel 2012). Regulators knew that 
banks might be understating their LIBOR submissions which is why they wanted the 
government to intervene in order to assist the banks. However, the Bank of England nor any 
other regulatory authority had received information regarding the fraudulent activities. Upper 
management likely knew about the collusion their traders and rate submitters were involved in 
but since fixing the rates in terms of helping their position in the market positively affected their 
respective solvency, they did not intervene. More than likely, they had the incentive to keep this 
information from regulatory authorities, as these authorities might have sanctioned them for 
irresponsible financial practices. United States monetary authorities reached the same 
conclusions as the Federal Reserve and provided further information that the Bank of England 
knew about the practice misreporting, but not the collective internal collusion (Kregel 2012). 
 14 
Government regulatory agencies ignorance regarding the trader’s manipulation does not absolve 
of them of their role in creating the scandal. Clearly, letting big banks self-regulate their 
financial practices can no longer exist as the Great Financial Crisis proved these profit seeking 
institutions will ultimately create instability in the system through their speculative business 
practices. Thus, regulatory agencies need to be more integrated with the daily financial practices 
of banks. In the case of the LIBOR scandal, member banks' upper management were more than 
likely aware of both types of manipulation that was occurring. Ultimately, their fraudulent risk 
management practices show that to some extent, they played a greater role in creating the 
LIBOR crisis than the federal regulatory agencies that were supposed to police them.   
LIBOR member banks that participated in manipulating the rates to their advantages had 
to endure many consequences.  Regulatory agencies imposed historically high penalties, totaling 
up $8 billion worth of fines on banks who were found manipulating the benchmark (Gandhi 
2016). The widespread nature of the manipulation still has regulatory agencies investigating 
several banks for fraud while, at the same time, some civil lawsuits are still in the process of 
being settled. It is possible that more lawsuits might emerge as a result of this scandal, as more 
investigations wrap up regarding LIBOR related fraud. Moreover, banks that participated in 
LIBOR fixing have also lost some legitimacy in terms of their reputation, which, to some 
degree, outweighs the cost of the penalties they were forced to pay. Perhaps, with the new 
stringent laws against LIBOR manipulation, along with the fact it is being phased out in 2023, 
will create a disincentive to manipulate rates. The question is why these penalties were not put 
into place earlier into the LIBOR timeline, especially when regulatory agencies knew that there 
was rate manipulation occurring within the financial system. In the end, the lack of harsh 
penalties on rate manipulation, created incentives for manipulation since there were no criminal 
penalties for the practice of rate fixing.  Now with the new credible threat of prosecution, along 
with the potential of dealing with high financial and reputation costs, some financial regulators 
predict LIBOR manipulation to consequently subside, making it possible to maintain this 
benchmark as part of the global economic system. However, this hypothesis fails to include the 
fact that most regulators and banks have completely lost faith in the LIBOR benchmark system. 
Even harsher penalties cannot help save the integrity of the rate which is why it needs to be 
reformed and replaced with a more accurate benchmark rate.  
Replacing the LIBOR:  
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  The LIBOR manipulation scandal made apparent three distinct problems associated 
with this benchmark rate. First, the close relationship between LIBOR submitters and the 
traders, who benefit from the submissions through the assets they have tied to the benchmark, 
create a conflict of interest. These personal relationships incentivize rate manipulation as fixing 
the rate will lead to personal gains (Hall 2013). Consider the example presented in the previous 
section where Barclay’s traders were influencing submitters to alter their LIBOR submissions so 
their positions in the market would be more profitable. Upper management was aware of these 
questionable practices but did not intervene to halt their destabilizing behavior as stopping this 
market manipulation would adversely affect earnings. Second, there is a public image issue as 
banks want to give the impression that they are financially stable. Hence, financial institutions 
tied to the LIBOR have the incentive to manipulate their respective submissions to enhance 
perceptions of financial stability. During the GFC, many banks were attempting to understate 
their LIBOR submissions to seem more stable than they were. At the same time, they were 
underestimating their own lending rates as these same banks were taking bailout money from 
the government to assist with their insolvency issues. The last problem that was made apparent 
from the crisis was there is a clear identifiable accuracy problem that stems from the notional 
nature of the LIBOR rates reported in the submission process (Hall 2013). Regulatory 
authorities in England such as the Bank of England and the FSA were aware that most member 
banks were understating their rates. Moreover, during the crisis, these regulatory agencies 
realized that banks LIBOR submissions would not be accurate due to their lack of liquidity and, 
thus, ordered banks to give their best guess of what their risk profile. The fallout from the crisis 
has created a complete decline in the interbank lending market tied to the LIBOR, mostly due to 
the fact most economic agents have lost faith in LIBORs integrity. Specifically, banks sharply 
curtailed their lending practices within the interbank market, as they were wary about the extent 
of subprime exposures and false reporting of other participating banks (Sundaresan 2009). As a 
result, interest rates in benchmark markets increased relative to the target Fed Funds rate. The 
spread on one month LIBOR increased from a stable 7 basis points spread to the Fed Funds rate 
to a massive 35 basis points (Sundaresan 2009).  In the current economic climate, the spread 
between the two rates has decreased due to improving economic conditions but there are still 
volatility risks within the contracts tied to this benchmark. The essential problem with LIBOR is 
the inherent fragility in pricing hundreds of trillions of dollars of financial instruments based on 
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the expert judgment of relatively few individuals, informed by a small base of unsecured 
interbank transactions (Putnam 2019).  
 As the LIBOR scandal became more public, U.K financial regulators commissioned a 
review and investigation of potential reforms of the LIBOR. The investigation produced a report 
called the Wheatley Review, which focused on implementing the proper sanctions for member 
banks that participated in LIBOR manipulation (Hall 2013). The committee commissioned to 
review the LIBOR’s integrity as a benchmark found that the structure of the LIBOR gave banks 
the incentive to manipulate their submissions for both credit stability purposes and to enhance 
their positions in the market. Moreover, the review also found that the interbank lending market 
that the LIBOR was founded on had completely dissipated prior and during the crisis. 
Therefore, it was difficult to accurately determine the member banks exact credit risk.  
It should be also noted that the report addressed the systematic issues that need to be 
dealt with when reforming the LIBOR, including reducing the opportunity for manipulation, 
increasing government oversight, and increasing the penalties for fraudulent behavior. The 
commission directly suggested various new laws to prevent such a crisis from occurring again. 
First, the commission argued that the FSA should be able to directly regulate LIBOR 
submissions and, in turn, eliminate their policy of self-regulation as clearly the banks cannot be 
trusted. New criminal offenses regarding LIBOR manipulation were introduced, giving the FSA 
the proper tools to fight corruption. Prior to the harsher sanctions, the FSA was limited to what 
charges they could bring against known LIBOR manipulators, in the sense, the worst penalties 
they could prosecute a corrupt banker with were strictly limited to the civil side of the law (Hall 
2013). Lastly, the review suggested that member banks submit with transparency, which means 
these banks must use actual transaction data in order to confirm the legitimacy of their rate 
submissions. Moreover, there should be a three-month delay before the BBA publishes any 
individual bank’s LIBOR submissions in order to guard against any institutions trying to alter 
their risk profile. 
The Wheatley Review made apparent numerous problems with the LIBOR and gave 
possible avenues for reform. However, some policy makers did not think its suggestions 
diverged enough from the hands-off approach regulatory agencies had taken prior to the crisis. 
Even though the Wheatley review suggested that the self-regulatory approach that incited the 
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scandal should be replaced, the commission still suggested that the cooperative relationship 
between regulatory agencies and firms remained an important aspect of the LIBOR benchmark 
(Hall 2013). For instance, although the Review calls for more transparency and accuracy of 
LIBOR submissions, it also recommends that the regulatory agencies should work with the 
member banks in the LIBOR rate setting process. Hence, the review contradicts itself as it 
suggests greater control over the banks submission methods but also wants them to be part of 
the rate submitting process.  
Since these issues regarding the Wheatley Commission have come to light, many 
economists have suggested alternative benchmarks. In the reformation process, some 
economists have suggested a two-benchmark approach in order to mitigate risks that arise from 
the single benchmark approach. One rate would consist of an improved version of the original 
LIBOR. It would continue to be based on banks’ wholesale unsecured funding costs and would 
be appropriate for applications that rest on the credit risk component, such as hedging the 
revenues of balance-sheet lenders (Duffie, Stein, 2014). The second benchmark would be based 
on a riskless or near-riskless rate that is established in a broad and deep market (Duffie, Stein, 
2014). This banking-oriented benchmark would be reformed similar to what the Wheatly review 
called for; to be purely transaction-based and subject to a tougher monitoring regime.  Since the 
majority of the manipulation that occurred with the LIBOR was due to positions banks had with 
interest rate swaps and other derivatives, the goal with the second alternative rate would be to 
give pure interest rate traders a large portion of the derivatives market to fit their risk exposures. 
Although this two-rate plan seems like a feasible avenue to take for reform, the large stock of 
legacy contracts already tied to LIBOR, make switching to such system difficult. Not to 
mention, there are numerous legal challenges among other contractual obligations that are 
difficult to alter if the LIBOR rate were to be changed into a two-rate system.  
Others have suggested merely switching the benchmark to an existing one is a feasible 
option. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates have been put forth as a candidate to replace the 
LIBOR by policy makers. This rate can be described as an interest rate swap agreement where a 
fixed rate is swapped against a pre-determined published index of a daily overnight reference 
rate (ICAP 2020).  Many derivative contracts have been tied to OIS rates, making a seamless 
transition from the LIBOR benchmark to an OIS rate possible. The OIS would utilize discount 
payments on financial contracts to mitigate the reliance on reference rates with a significant 
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credit risk component (Hou, Skeie, 2014). However, the issue with this proposal is that longer 
term OIS rates are not available for financial securities which make transitioning long-term 
LIBOR tied investments to an OIS rate difficult. Another suggestion that has been proposed by 
regulators is to use general collateral repo rates as a possible replacement for the LIBOR. Under 
the framework of this plan, the General Collateral Finance Repurchase Agreement Index 
(GCF® Repo Index) would be utilized to track the value of securities instead of the LIBOR. 
Regulators believe that the GCF® Repo Index , since it is transaction-based, would better reflect 
the true funding costs of banks. The index itself is calculated as the weighted average interest 
rate paid on overnight GCF® repo transactions. These GCF® repo transactions are fully 
collateralized by U.S. Treasury securities, agency debt, and agency Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(MBS)  (Hou, Skeie, 2014). Hence, it would demonstrate stronger resilience to illiquidity under 
financial fragility and more effectively fend off attempts at manipulation due its centralized or 
highly regulated nature (Hou, Skeie, 2014). Lastly with the GCF® Repo Index, there would be 
no need to create a new agency to regulate this rate as the Depository Trust & Clearing 
Corporation (DTCC) currently calculates the index and could continue in this role. Ultimately, 
for these reasons, GCF® repo transaction market was chosen to be the underlying market for the 
new U.S. benchmark.  
As a result of the crisis, the BBA gave up control of the LIBOR and NYSE Euronext 
won the competitive bid for LIBOR for a nominal price of 1 pound (Hou, Skeie, 2014). The 
crisis caused by LIBOR manipulation had caused many investors and banks to lose faith in the 
rate, thus, most policy makers concluded that it must be replaced. Cooperating with the Office 
of Financial Research, created under Dodd Frank legislation,, whose main function is to 
promote economic growth and maintain stability by improving the quality and transparency of 
financial data, the Federal Reserve, announced its intention to produce three new reference rates 
based upon trade-level data from various segments of the repo market: TGCR – Tri-party 
General Collateral Rate, BGCR – Broad General Collateral Rate, and Secured Overnight 
Financing Rate (SOFR) (Frost 2017). The SOFR is set to replace the LIBOR in 2023 as the new 
benchmark rate for the Eurodollar market. It is the broadest of the three financial rates detailed 
above and its aim is to give better transparency for market participants and prevent against the 
fraudulent behavior that undermined the credibility of the previous LIBOR based system. Since 
the transition has been gradual, policymakers argue that the possible negative effects on 
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investors should be minimal. However, even with a smooth transition, valuation differences are 
likely to arise, particularly for interest rate swaps, mortgage-backed securities, and derivatives. 
For this reason, investors with sizable books of LIBOR tied assets will want to carefully manage 
their risk before the transition and will have to begin to prepare to start trading with SOFR-
linked products. The next section will detail the SOFR, and the potential challenges financial 
participants are going to face with such a major transition.  
Chapter 3: The SOFR  
Introduction to the SOFR:  
After the LIBOR scandal, the Federal Reserve decided to transition LIBOR tied 
securities to an alternative benchmark rate called the SOFR. The overall goal of the SOFR is to 
replace the LIBOR as the main benchmark rate for financial participants who trade these 
floating rate securities. The SOFR can be described as a benchmark rate that is 
determined based on Treasury repo transactions. Moreover, the rate is supported by extremely 
liquid markets and can be concretely determined based on market transactions (Jerman 2019). 
Unlike the LIBOR, which relies on the integrity of reporting member banks, the SOFR is 
created by concrete market data which closes any loophole for banks to misreport their risk 
profile. The Federal Reserve argues that Treasury repo markets make a safe economic indicator 
because, during the recent financial crisis, these repo markets stayed relatively stable while most 
aspects of the global economy suffered a major downturn. By replacing the LIBOR with the 
SOFR, the Federal Reserve expects this reference rate to be less volatile to market disruptions 
and manipulation, because of the low-risk nature of its underlying market2. However, with the 
recent securitization of LIBOR assets, the question remains whether the SOFR will adequately 
manage the financial participants who undertake these transactions.  
Explaining Repo Markets:  
A repo market is an abbreviation for the banking process known as a repurchase 
agreement which can also be described as a short-term secured loan. In this market, financial 
institutions sell securities to each other and agree to repurchase those securities later at a higher 
                                                        
2 Treasury General Collateral Repo market  
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price (Cheng and Wessel 2020). Since this transaction is a short-term loan, the securities act as 
collateral, allowing the loan to be complete. Repo rates are calculated by considering the 
difference between the securities’ initial price and their repurchase price. The repo market is an 
important market for financial institutions that own lots of securities as it gives them the ability 
to borrow funds cheaply. Generally, financial institutions are averse to the idea of holding cash 
because it does not pay interest. However, these transactions allow parties with lots of liquidity 
to earn a small return on that cash without much risk, because U.S. Treasury securities serve as 
collateral (Cheng and Wessel 2020). The Federal Reserve also uses the repo market to conduct 
monetary policy. When the Fed buys securities on the repo market from a financial institution 
who agrees to repurchase them, it is injecting reserves into the financial system (Cheng and 
Wessel). Conversely, if the Federal Reserve wants to drain reserves from the financial system it 
merely must sell securities with an agreement to repurchase. As a result of the crisis, repos have 
taken on new importance as a monetary policy tool, because it became increasingly important 
for the Federal Reserve to affect member bank behavior. However, the SOFR’s dependence on 
repo rate behavior can have negative effects on member banks. If banks default premiums 
increase, the repo markets can be adversely affected which can cause the SOFR to decline 
(Jerman 2019). Therefore, there are many questions regarding whether the repo market can 
safely act as the underlying market for the SOFR.  
Characteristics of the SOFR:  
The Federal Reserve created the SOFR with the emphasis on two characteristics. First, it 
will be a fully transaction-based overnight rate which encompasses a robust underlying market. 
This differs from the LIBOR, in the sense, submissions to the LIBOR are still based on notional 
transactions, while the transaction nature of the SOFR will offer a more accurate submission of 
banks’ lending standards. Second, it will cover multiple repo market segments allowing for 
further expansion (Frost 2017). The SOFR will correlate closely with other money benchmarks 
such as the USD LIBOR, the overnight bank funding rate (OBFR), and the Tri party collateral 
rate (TBFR), both in the short run and in the long run. The relationship between the given rates 
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can be demonstrated by the chart below. 
 
   Due to the SOFR’s dependence on the repo market, the Federal Reserve decided, in 
order to keep the integrity of the rate, there needed to be some alterations to repo market so it 
could adequately serve the new benchmark. Specifically, any Federal Reserve transactions will 
be removed from this market along with any arm’s length transactions between affiliated 
entities. Trades that are characterized as “open” which are economically like overnight trades 
will be allowed to be pegged to the SOFR benchmark. By trimming the functions of the bilateral 
repo market to serve the SOFR needs, businesses can invest cash in a market where specific 
Treasury issues are denoted, to minimize risk (Frost 2017). Moreover, financial institutions who 
want to acquire specific Treasury issues with scarcity value will have the ability to do so. 
Hence, by altering the bilateral repo market, the SOFR will offer a reasonable balance between 
special trading activities and maintaining financial volumes for banks. With the failures of the 
LIBOR reporting process, the Federal Reserve in its creation of the SOFR emphasized a better 
financial structure. In order to accurately collect data, regulatory agencies who govern the SOFR 
will mandate widespread data collection, oversight, and transparency. In the case this reporting 
process fails, there will also be a daily survey of primary dealers who will work with overnight 
repo borrowing transactions that will act as a potential contingency data source. Banks who 
operate under the SOFR will be subject to new extensive regular reviews by oversight agencies 
to ensure these institutions are not undertaking risky financial practices. Specifically, to prevent 
collusion between the reporters of the rates and the individual traders of member banks, staff 
who work for the oversight committee will be subject to ethical oversight reviews that will 
identify any conflict of interests that could lead to fraud. The task of regulating, reporting, and 
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providing transaction-level date for the SOFR has been given to The Bank of New York Mellon 
(BNYM) and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) (Frost 2017).  
Fundamentally, the SOFR differs from LIBOR, which will create some challenges in 
terms of transitioning LIBOR tied securities towards this new rate. The valuations of these 
securities will fluctuate because the SOFR is an overnight rate while the LIBOR is reported on a 
more long-term basis. Thus, a focus of the Federal Reserve, in terms of dealing with the 
transition to SOFR, will center around replacing short term LIBOR rates in cash products and 
derivative contracts. A more glaring difference can be seen in the fact that the SOFR is based on 
secured borrowing while LIBOR is based on unsecured borrowing (Jerman 2019). When 
member banks operated under the benchmark rate of the LIBOR, loan rates were able to provide 
a hedge for lenders’ fluctuating funding costs. SOFR does not have this property, and it operates 
under the pretense of secured borrowing to mitigate the risk that resulted from risky hedges by 
member banks with the LIBOR.   
The charts above show that the early projections of SOFR portray its behavior as 
synonymous with repo rates.  Hence, based on repo rates’ behavior during the recent financial 
crisis, SOFR can be expected to decline at times when banks’ default premiums increase 
(Jerman 2019). Member banks who operated under the LIBOR are accustomed to these 
fluctuations, so this type of benchmark volatility will be easy for financial institutions to factor 
into their risk management practices. However, with the Federal Reserve continuing to delay 
this transition, it is currently uncertain to what extent these changes could affect banks’ balance 
sheets and to what degree this transition will impact global markets.  
Due to the Federal Reserve's new position to delay the transition, there are limited 
economic projections regarding the global market effects of the SOFR. Experts conclude that a 
key difference between the rates is how they react in the event of funding shocks. With the 
LIBOR benchmark, the interest rate index increases in correlation with increasing bank defaults 
(Jerman 2019). Conversely, when the cost of lending increases for the SOFR, the risk-free rate 
declines mildly (Jerman 2019). Moreover, in the event of a funding shock, some policy makers 
are concerned that the SOFR lacks the safety measures to replace the LIBOR. Unlike the SOFR, 
the capital gains related to outstanding LIBOR pegged loans, to some extent, offset the negative 
effects caused by the increasing risk to banks. This safeguard is not built into the SOFR due to 
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the fact its creators wanted to limit the member banks’ ability to hedge their risk within the new 
benchmark. Ultimately, projections of the current LIBOR show that during a funding shock 
member banks default less, cut loan volumes by less, and cut investment by less in the 
domestic economy. These projections conclude that the LIBOR index would be a better choice 
to offset the negative effects of a funding crisis than the SOFR. However, it should be noted, 
that quantitatively, the LIBOR’s success in managing the effects of this type of shock are only 
slightly better than the SOFR index.  
In some cases, the loans indexed to LIBOR can offer insurance to lenders against 
adverse funding shocks. The SOFR does not reference banking solvency costs directly, making 
it difficult to guard against banking funding issues. Thus, the viability of pegging loans to a rate 
that does not reference bank funding costs directly, such as SOFR, is up for debate. However, 
bank solvency issues have only recently been a major factor in the United States economy, such 
as the 2008 financial crisis. Under normal economic circumstances, the aggregate economy will 
not have issues indexing loans to the SOFR. However, if another crisis, like the GFC occurs, the 
loss of this automatic stabilizer created by the LIBOR might make recovery difficult. Therefore, 
when the switch to the SOFR begins, banks may need to change their risk management practices 
to account for these differences.  
Some analysts have created SOFR proxies to quantitively define the differences between 
the LIBOR and the SOFR. Specifically, these projections show how these benchmarks might 
behave in a situation like the GFC.  It is evident from the chart below that from the years 2007-
2010 where the GFC was at its height that there is a clear dichotomy between the behavior of 
SOFR rate and LIBOR rate. This chart further supports the argument that these rates respond 
differently to periods of economic volatility (Brill 2020). 
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The explanation for this difference is centered on the transaction-based nature of the SOFR. 
During periods of the financial recession, lenders are more inclined to increase the rate at which 
borrowers and financial institutions with high-risk profiles will be charged. However, in 
especially unstable financial conditions, such as the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, lenders also 
have the option to halt lending to market participants with these highly risky profiles. 
Effectively this stoppage induced by lenders drives down the median rate paid which, 
consequently, drives down the SOFR benchmark.  
 
Is the transition ill advised? 
The initial announcement by the Federal Reserve and U.K. regulatory agencies declared 
that the LIBOR will be phased out in 2021. However, as a result of the increased volatility in 
financial markets, stemming from the Covid pandemic, global banking regulators agreed to push 
the proposed transition to 2023.  During the year 2021, the Federal Reserve is encouraging 
banks to not engage in any new LIBOR pegged financial contracts thereby, ensuring a seamless 
transition to the SOFR in 2023. While the Federal Reserve has yet to release a complete plan for 
transitioning existing banks LIBOR tied contracts to the SOFR which is creating uncertainty 
among investors and financial institutions alike. Some economists are calling this proposed 
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transition ill-advised and are explicitly stating the “2017 decision by the Fed to do away with 
LIBOR is one of the most ill-considered and thoughtless actions taken by the US central bank in 
many years'' (Whalen 2020).  They also argue that the Federal Reserve has displayed a lack of 
understanding of capital markets in the process of making this decision. The following section 
will analyze the arguments made by SOFR critics and detail the Federal Reserve’s response to 
these anxious financial participants.  
As stated above the Federal Reserve believes the SOFR can act as a broad and safe 
measure of the cost of borrowing as it is collateralized by Treasury securities (Whalen 
2020).  However, the main issue with transitioning to the SOFR is that there is no discernable 
market for it. Simply put, there is already a market for the LIBOR where financial institutions 
can conduct financial transactions in USD. SOFR has interesting research perspectives, in terms 
of creating a risk-free rate, but one that lacks actual liquidity, making it increasingly difficult to 
move LIBOR tied contracts to a market that does not exist yet. For example, an unsecured loan 
pegged to the LIBOR is going to be priced considerably differently when pegged to the SOFR 
as the SOFR utilizes repo transactions as collateral and is margined every night (Whalen 
2020).    
Economists and regulators who doubt the feasibility of transitioning to a new rate, argue 
that the best solution for fixing the LIBOR is to fix the existing benchmark. To them, the idea of 
a “risk free rate” seems like a fallacy and trying to utilize insured depository institutions to fund 
the SOFR for actual risk-taking practices seems financially misguided. Specifically, some 
investors are especially worried about the effects this transition will have on the futures 
contracts and the housing market, especially mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  Different 
securitized products have diverging references within the LIBOR in terms of their underlying 
loans. These contracts could be even more complex in the sense that they might have swap deals 
and other financial instruments tied to them.  With all these different complexities, critics argue 
that there is a dangerous component of asking banks to undertake billions of dollars of risk 
using SOFR as the pricing mechanism, especially when no investors have pegged contracts or 
traded utilizing the new benchmark.  In response to these criticisms the Federal Reserve cites 
that the SOFR is built upon highly liquid markets and that the transition will be relatively 
seamless if banks avoid engaging in new LIBOR pegged contracts. However, the real issue is 
that there is much uncertainty regarding not only the financial terms of contracts but also their 
 26 
legal terms. Questions remain whether long term LIBOR contracts will still have legal standing 
with the SOFR and the uncertainty behind these legal issues is worrying financial participants.  
 As of the year 1998, markets trade a daily average of $155 billion in interest rate swaps 
and $10 billion in currency swaps. In terms of options and derivatives, the average daily volume 
of trades was valued at approximately 87 billion dollars (Walmsley 2000). Hence, it is evident 
that traders see the financial returns from these types of trades and are transitioning their 
financial activities to deal in these types of securities. Futures contracts are popular derivative 
contract among investors who trade utilizing the LIBOR as their primary benchmark. These 
contracts are standardized agreements to buy as well as sell a specific commodity at a specific 
time, at a price established through a central authority (Walmsley 2000).  For traders, the 
attraction to futures contracts and other derivatives is the leverage that is associated with these 
deals. Consider a situation where a trader takes a future position based on either speculation or 
arbitrage. The trader wants to back his position as he stands to make a profit if his information is 
correct. Hence, the trader will trade on margin giving them a high degree of leverage. The trader 
can make a healthy profit off their position compared to the amount of money that is committed 
to the trade. However, the concept of leverage can also work against the trader as it is possible 
to lose more money than what was committed if prices move against the traders’ position. 
Futures contracts also give traders the ability to offer hedges to their customers who want to 
borrow and help them trade against other markets, such as the interest rate swap market 
(Walmsley 2000.)  Lastly, they are also extremely liquid which adds to their desirability. The 
risky nature of futures contracts tends to make them unsuccessful which is why many traders 
colluded with reporting agencies to make sure the LIBOR would shift to make their contracts 
profitable. With the transition to the SOFR, there are still many uncertainties regarding the 
pricing of futures contracts that have long term implications. The Federal Reserve is 
emphasizing banks should stop issuing long term futures contracts to ensure a smooth 
transitionary period but there is no current incentive to discourage the banks from continuing to 
get involved in these lucrative deals. Essentially, the ability to lock in futures rates for banks 
might be too attractive to halt until the transition in 2023. Currently, banks seem to be acting 
responsibly by sticking with shorter term contracts until the transition is complete as there has 
not been much recent volatility with LIBOR index.  However, this does not rule out the 
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possibility that the transition to the SOFR could cause significant price fluctuations within the 
futures market, where banks could see major losses.  
Legacy non-agency residential mortgage-backed securities otherwise known as, 
RMBS, are the most exposed due to the transition (Morgan Stanley 2019). However, the volume 
of RMBS contracts being traded within the market has shrunk significantly, especially after the 
Great Financial Crisis. Morgan Stanley has the non-agency RMBS market valued at more than 
$2 trillion at its peak but today most analysts have the total market valued at a rough outstanding 
value of $400 billion (Morgan Stanley 2019). More importantly, only a small share of these 
current contracts is still pegged to the LIBOR. Recently issued RMBS securities already have 
clauses detailing out how rates will be handled during the transition from LIBOR to SOFR. 
Despite these contingency plans, communicating these rate changes to borrowers still pose an 
issue for financial agents. Since the SOFR is an overnight rate, MBS products that are 
transitioned to this new benchmark will still have varying interest rate fluctuations. Hence, when 
the switch occurs, initially lenders will need to estimate interest rates for consumers who wish to 
borrow using a prior compounding period. 
  The main issue SOFR critics have when it comes to this transition is the risk of 
switching such a complex, highly securitized market to an unknown rate, where the effects of 
such a shift are relatively unknown. They suggest that when the Federal Reserve made the 
decision to eliminate the LIBOR, it failed to account for the legal risk, operational risk, credit 
risk, regulatory risk, and reputational risk for banks. In other words, there is a possibility that the 
transition to the SOFR results in a complete capital market failure which would cause 
widespread financial instability throughout global economic system. To safeguard against such 
an event from happening, LIBOR supporters argue that the best way to move forward is to fix 
the process of reporting for the current LIBOR benchmark by increasing financial oversight to 
limit collusions and other fraudulent behavior. By forcing banks to transition over to a new 
benchmark rate, the Federal Reserve is creating more issues for financial institutions and 
participants. If the Federal Reserve is indeed focused on repealing the LIBOR, opponents of 
SOFR argue that a more feasible option is to price LIBOR related products against the forward 
market, rather than creating a new benchmark (Whalen 2020). Ultimately, participants who are 
against the SOFR state that the Federal Reserve’s approach to stabilize capital markets through 
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the implementation of a new benchmark is completely misguided, as forcing US banks and 
investors to adopt the SOFR standard would put the entire global economy at risk.  
The financial agents who are actively against the switch to the SOFR fail to 
acknowledge, in their arguments, the lack of faith financial participants have in the LIBOR. The 
LIBOR Scandal exposed the fraud and manipulation that traders, CEO’s and credit agencies 
committed. Hence, the LIBOR benchmark is no longer treated with the same financial 
trustworthiness as it once was, prior to GFC. In fact, the United States is not the only country 
that is transitioning away from the LIBOR.  The table below portrays four major global 
financial powers and the rates that they are adopting to replace the LIBOR. Considering the 
LIBOR has lost its creditworthiness in the global economy, it does not make any sense for the 
United States to keep a benchmark rate in place where financial participants do not trust the 
actual reporting.  
 
Country LIBOR Rate 
New Risk-Free 
Rate 
United States USD LIBOR SOFR 
United 
Kingdom 
GBP LIBOR SONIA 
Japan 
TIBOR, JPY LIBOR and Euroyen 
TIBOR 
TONA 
Europe EURIBOR and EUR LIBOR ESTER 
In fact, the number of banks that report to the LIBOR have dwindled significantly since 
the GFC and the volume of trading with LIBOR based securities has also shrunk significantly 
(Brill 2020). Moreover, many of the banks that still operate with the LIBOR benchmark no 
longer use the rate to swap Euro deposits but use it to value their derivative contracts as well as 
other high-risk securities.  
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 Many economists seem to have a “disaster mindset” when it comes to the transition to 
the SOFR. These economists are not completely incorrect that there could be operational, legal, 
and financial risks in terms of shifting the benchmark rate to the SOFR, but it seems 
overreaching to argue that the shift could result in a complete failure for global capital markets. 
The purpose of the fallback clauses in recently issued LIBOR contracts is to act as a safeguard 
that minimizes the risk of the transition to the financial system. Valuation fluctuations are 
inevitable particularly for interest rate swaps, derivatives and other long-term contracts but if 
these contingency clauses are written in, volatility will remain at a minimum. Perhaps the 
biggest risk is that LIBOR will end prematurely, either because the number of member banks 
falls below the required minimum or because regulators trigger an early end. This would make 
banks have to change their financial practices earlier than expected which could create market 
volatility.  
Although reforming the LIBOR seems like the easier, more efficient route for the global 
economy, replacing the benchmark seems like a more adequate solution, as there is no need to 
keep a rate around where the financial participants are wary of its accuracy, along with the fact 
its initial function of serving as an interbank mechanism for Euro deposits has mostly vanished. 
If member banks continue to plan for the transition and regulators remain vigilant in terms of 
evaluating LIBOR tied contracts, the switch should occur without much market disruption. 
Market fluctuations will occur in the short run but, in the long run, SOFR offers a low-risk 
alternative to LIBOR that has the potential to maintain financial stability to an existing market 
with lots of growth and risk potential.  
SOFR’s Impact on the Basel Accords: 
 The Basel Accords are a set of sequential banking laws that are adopted internationally 
by all banks that operate within global capital markets.  Specifically, the accords emphasize 
banking discipline in the areas of capital adequacy, supervisory regulation, and speculative risk 
taking. Theoretically, following the Basel Accords is a voluntary practice for banks. However, 
the reality is, banks do not have much of a choice in abiding by these regulations. Countries 
whose banks do not implement the risk management practices recommended by the Basel 
Committee are subject to numerous sanctions. “Most notably, the lending programmes of the 
IMF and World Bank come with conditions attached, and these conditions include compliance 
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with this international regulatory committee” (Ward 2002). The importance of the Basel 
Accords to the global economic make it necessary to analyze the impact the transition to the 
SOFR will have on these policies.  
Like the mandates given by the Federal Reserve, the Basel Committee is recommending 
that banks alter their risk management practices to account for the shift from the LIBOR. Their 
first mandate is for banks to phase out all LIBOR tied contracts to ensure a seamless transition. 
By phasing out these contracts’ banks will be able avoid the high operational, financial and legal 
risk that is involved with such a complex market transition. In cases where banks have long term 
contracts tied to the LIBOR, the Basel Committee takes a stance that is like the Federal Reserve, 
encouraging these financial institutions to add contingencies in the form of robust fall-back 
language to help mitigate any valuation risk (BIS 2020). The committee recommends that the 
fallback language in these contracts should try to estimate how these contracts would run when 
the SOFR fully replaces the LIBOR. To make sure banks do not succumb to the operational as 
well as the legal risks from the transition, the committee also advises financial institutions to 
ensure that their internally developed systems are prepared fully to accommodate the new 
reference rate. Thus, it is imperative that the United States financial authorities monitor the 
internal systems set up by member banks to handle the transition. Given the profit seeking 
nature of large financial institutions, it would be ill advised for regulatory agencies to not 
increase their oversight on these long-term LIBOR pegged contracts. If banks decide to neglect 
their risk management practices pertaining to the transition, solvency issues could arise, and 
capital market failures could spread throughout the economic system.  
Any reclassification of assets will have an impact on the balance sheet of banks, which, 
if there is a capital market failure, could affect banks overall solvency. Hence, in response to 
these potential negative economic effects, the Basel Committee has hired accounting standard 
setters to analyze the accounting effects from the transition to the alternative reference rate. The 
committee has commissioned the International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) to 
monitor the ongoing transition and help banks develop high quality accounting standards to 
assist in the process. In the words of the Basel Committee, “accounting treatments regarding 
issues that may arise from benchmark reform are important for most banks, given that the 
interest rates subject to reform are widely used in a large volume and broad range of financial 
products and contracts” (Hernández de Cos 2019). The IASB made certain recommendations to 
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banks regarding how they should alter their accounting methods to manage the increased risk 
during this transitionary period. Moreover, the IASB’s draft also states that their organization 
intends to monitor any ongoing developments pertaining to this transition. Currently, the issues 
the IASB are focusing on are centered around the valuations of hedged instruments and the 
liquidity of the alternative benchmark. With hedged securities, the IASB is trying to ascertain if 
the new benchmark rate leads to a discontinuation of the previously agreed upon LIBOR pegged 
contract.  In terms of liquidity, the IASB is making sure all global alternative benchmark rates 
have the necessary liquidity to handle the contracts that were pegged to the LIBOR.   
The last issue that the Basel Committee raises is whether the new valuations of contracts 
on banks’ balance sheets affect their capital requirements. A valuation of LIBOR tied security 
under the SOFR could be classified as a newly created instrument, which breaches the minimum 
maturity and call date clauses that are part of the regulatory guidelines enforced by the Basel 
Committee (BIS 2020). Moreover, there is the potential that existing capital instruments that fall 
under the LIBOR could also fail to meet eligibility requirements if they are treated as new 
instruments (BIS 2020). With the transition imminent, the committee is emphasizing their 
stance on this issue. They have reiterated their commitment to upholding their regulatory 
guidelines by stating any amendments to capital instruments solely to account for the transition 
will not result in them being treated as new financial securities (BIS 2020). This ensures that 
these securities will still abide by the minimum maturity and call date requirements that the 
Basel Committee enforces (BIS 2020). Even though banks cannot treat their old LIBOR 
contracts as completely new financial instruments, it is still imperative that banks amend their 
financial instruments to accommodate for the transition to lessen any risk of a capital market 
failure. Since financial institutions are inherently profit seeking mechanisms, it is again 
important to emphasize that both domestic and international regulatory agencies remain 
involved in monitoring these firms' risk management practices, which will ensure the transition 
happens efficiently.  
The next chapter, will discuss policy recommendations that will help maintain financial 
stability through the transition. More importantly, it will also analyze the different viable 
options for reforming the LIBOR and come to a conclusion on what the best course of action is 
regarding the future of benchmark rates.  
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Chapter 4: Policy Implications  
Big Government and Big Banks is the Path to Reinforcing Financial Stability:  
 Many regulators and economists have come forward with plans of how to best regulate 
the highly securitized public capital market industry to prevent financial incoherence. However, 
these plans will be ineffective if both the Federal Government and the Federal Reserve do not 
take a more vested interest in regulating these markets. With the innovation of financial 
instruments, the government can no longer continue to use the mainstream, laissez-faire attitude 
towards regulating banks, especially ones that currently operate with contracts pegged to the 
LIBOR. Perhaps, in the 1960’s when LIBOR tied banks were mainly trading Euro deposits, this 
laissez faire policy was acceptable but with the increased securitization of the LIBOR 
benchmark, this mandate is no longer acceptable for ensuring financial stability. The LIBOR 
scandal is a perfect example of the economic effects of self-regulation. When profit seeking 
banks are allowed to self-regulate themselves, they become more inclined to undertake complex 
hedging techniques along with unnecessary risk which can cause financial incoherence. 
Movements in the price of LIBOR tied securities were amplified due to the dynamic hedging 
and collusion many traders were involved in. At the same time, these practices increased the 
systemic risk as well. (Vrolijk 1997). When institutions try to hedge their entire risk exposure, 
as in the LIBOR crisis, the failure of s single dealer can generate a system wide collapse 
(Vrolijk 1997).  Even if the Federal Reserve shifts the LIBOR market to another benchmark rate 
but continues to let banks operate unregulated, the same speculative practices involving risky 
contracts, will continue to cause fragility within the financial system.  
 Regulation is intended to make financial markets more stable by ensuring banks stay 
within their margins of safety. Both the Federal Reserve and the Federal Government can 
achieve this though passing policy that focuses on liquidity requirements and increased capital 
requirements. However, the implications of creating an over stringent banking policy could 
result in increasing systemic risk as these policies reduce banks' profit margins which creates a 
situation where they might become inclined to undertake bigger risks in order to make up for the 
loss of profits. Other problems that arise from trying to regulate banks include issues relating to 
conflicts of interest and unregulated shadow banks.  There is an inherent conflict of interest that 
exists between banks and consumers as well as banks and regulatory authorities (Kregel 2009). 
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Essentially, banks forget their fiduciary responsibilities to clients and focus on profit seeking 
practices to enhance their respective bottom lines which can result in their customers losing 
their savings. Banks also have a direct relationship with many regulatory authorities which 
makes it difficult for these agencies to unbiasedly govern these financial institutions.   Lastly, 
the vast size and interconnectedness of banks is an issue. Regulatory agencies struggle to 
resolve any speculative practices with large financial institutions as their positions are exposed 
to numerous unrelated shadow banks and financial institutions that are unable to be regulated or 
tracked by institutional authorities (Kregel 2009). These shadow institutions were often used to 
store Eurodollar deposits in offshore markets in order to help facilitate risky, unregulated deals. 
The combination of these issues creates an environment that encourages fraudulent behavior and 
creates more systematic risk. 
Unfortunately, even if the government and the Federal Reserve coordinate their 
economic policies effectively, it is difficult to ensure complete financial stability.  For example, 
in the Feds current role as a monetary authority, its function as the lender of last resort, can 
perpetuate risky behavior by financial institutions.  In times of crisis, the Fed has the option to 
bail out their member banks to mitigate solvency issues. If banks know that they will be bailed 
out, as in the LIBOR scandal, these institutions will be more inclined ignore their fiduciary 
responsibilities and engage in risky financial behavior. Hence, institutions will focus their 
positions in financial instruments that compromise their solvency. The Federal Reserve cannot 
afford to let banks go insolvent for the negative economic effects it will have on deposit and 
savings accounts (Minsky 1985). Moreover, with the introduction of TAF’s (Term Auction 
Facility), banks have found another source of funding to assist them in their risky behavior. 
TAF’s were first established as a mechanism for banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve 
during the GFC and LIBOR scandal for a term of approximately one month by posting a variety 
of collateral products. Most posted mortgage-backed assets as collateral as no financial 
participants in the private market wanted these contracts due to their instability during the GFC. 
Banks have now taken advantage of these short-term loans by creating products that are only 
used for collateral which gives them access to these short-term loans while, at the same time, 
leaving the Federal Reserve and ECB holding assets that are difficult to value and have no 
reliable price in secondary markets (Sundaresan 2009). The challenge for the regulators of the 
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SOFR will be to find solutions that can placate the issues that arise from this new wave of 
financialization.  
 The Federal Reserve believes that transitioning to the SOFR will create better regulation 
of these institutions. However, it is difficult to foresee how much better the Bank of New York 
Mellon (BNYM) and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) will do in terms 
of regulating the SOFR benchmark. The current regulation standards that govern large banks 
that committed fraudulent behavior under the LIBOR, such as Barclays, will more than likely 
not be sufficient to deal with the systematic financial risk that arises from benchmark tied 
banking. Perhaps, a solution the government and the Federal Reserve could use to better 
regulate these financial institutions is to revert to the stringent financial regulation that 
characterized the “New Deal” era. In this specific period, the Federal Reserve and the Federal 
Government both took an active role in regulating financial markets. These practices provide a 
functional base the current monetary and fiscal authorities could utilize to regulate the SOFR 
benchmark. It should be noted though that the processes of multifunctional banking and 
securitization were not as prominent during the New Deal era, so the laws need to be updated to 
account for the changes in the global financial system (Kregel 2009). In other words, as the 
process of financialization, evolves, the role of financial authorities and their policy tools need 
to evolve as well.  
A simple regulatory procedure the Federal Reserve could impose on banks to better 
monitor their financial activity is the discount window. If the Federal Reserve lends through the 
discount window, their ability to monitor the banks’ balance sheets increases. Moreover, the 
discount window allows the Federal Reserve to be involved in banks everyday activities, giving 
them more institutional control. Currently, the Federal Reserve continues to lend through open 
market operations. Banks that will operate utilizing the SOFR benchmark will bid on reserves 
utilizing this process. Transitioning the reserve lending policy to the discount window might 
give the Federal Reserve more insight to the financial contracts banks are entering and prevent 
them from taking on unnecessary risk exposure. Another issue that the U.S. government has had 
regarding monitoring benchmarks is centered around their inability to regulate transactions 
within the underlying market.  Large financial institutions, with their numerous shadow bank 
arms, were extremely difficult to regulate under the traditional LIBOR benchmark as all 
transactions were cleared in external markets. The switch to SOFR will make these transactions 
 35 
clear within U.S, markets which will hopefully give regulatory authorities more financial 
oversight. To further ensure financial stability, the U.S. government could supplement the 
switch to the new clearing method by also reducing the size of these big banks. An act, like the 
repealed Glass-Steagall legislation, could be implemented in order to hold large financial 
institutions to their fiduciary responsibilities. It would also break up their relationships with 
their shadow bank arms. When Glass-Steagall regulated the financial industry, it helped direct 
investment towards productive activities that would help generate future income and 
employment (Kregel 2012). By reducing the size of these banks through an act like Glass-
Steagall, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Government could allow banks to fail without 
generating a system wide collapse and make banks a more productive asset to the overall 
economy. The risky nature of the securities SOFR member banks engage in also makes 
transparency an issue. In order to ensure accountability and to help with regulatory practices, 
both the Federal Reserve and the Federal Government should ensure that banks make their 
positions public. Moreover, regulatory agencies should require banks to calculate their exposure 
tied to interest rates in a more accurate fashion. Both regulatory entities, the Bank of New York 
Mellon (BNYM) and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), involved in 
monitoring the SOFR are making banks report their positions more accurately with the new 
benchmark. However, whether these transactions will be made more public to investors, is not 
yet completely known.  
Although there have been some promising steps to ensuring stability regarding the 
SOFR benchmark, it is slightly worrisome that both monetary and federal authorities find it 
acceptable that a large private financial institution, like the Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), 
can monitor SOFR transactions unilaterally. In 1985, BNYM had flaws in their internal systems 
which caused its monitoring controls to fail (Ennis and Price 2015). The software failure was 
due to the large volume of transactions that the bank was trying to clear. BNYM systems simply 
could not handle the immense volume of financial transactions, which caused their database of 
accounts to be damaged (Ennis and Price 2015). The system failure prevented their internal 
database to direct transaction information to the New York Fed and hence, BNYM was not 
receiving any payments to offset the debits that the New York Fed was taking out of its account. 
“As transactions flowed in for which BoNY could not make redelivery, the bank rapidly 
accumulated day-light overdrafts with the New York Fed, totaling more than $20 billion” (Ennis 
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and Price 2015). Ultimately, the Federal Reserve had to utilize to discount window to support 
BNYM during this software failure. The SOFR’s integrity is completely dependent on the 
BNYM’s ability to clear and report transactions. If the bank has experienced issues in the past 
with handling large transaction volumes, similar issues could arise from handling transactions 
related to the SOFR benchmark. By being more involved in the SOFR clearing process, the 
Federal Reserve and the Federal Government could prevent these market failures from 
happening and ensure financial stability with this new benchmark.  
From an outside perspective, the current regulatory framework that have been proposed 
to govern the SOFR benchmark is not stringent enough to facilitate responsible growth within 
global financial markets. Some changes have been made, in terms of regulation, but the Federal 
Government and Federal Reserve seem content in leaving the majority of the SOFR’s regulation 
to private authorities.  If both arms of the government continue to shirk their regulation 
responsibilities for this new benchmark, similar fraudulent and risky practices will occur, 
leading to widespread economic destabilization.  
Two Rate System:    
Economic forecasters are concerned about the SOFR’s ability to remain stable in times 
of increased volatility and its capacity to monitor complex level securitization. Many forecasters 
argue that the proposition of a second benchmark rate acting as a complement to the SOFR 
would help alleviate volatility within public capital markets. In this proposal, one of the 
benchmark rates would be like the LIBOR as it would be based on banks unsecured funding and 
would index the credit risk of member banks (Duffie and Stein 2015). The structure of second 
benchmark is like the proposed version of the SOFR, as it would be based on a near-riskless rate 
and purely transactions-based. However, unlike the proposed version of the SOFR, its only 
function will be to track the values of the securities being traded within this space. Regulation of 
the interbank lending market will be strictly left the other benchmark. Since the second 
benchmark rate will be based on a thinner underlying market, the incentive to manipulate and 
commit fraud will decrease. Moreover, this second benchmark would also be subject to a 
tougher monitoring regime, compared to the initial version of the LIBOR (Duffie Stein 
2015). Supporters of the two-rate benchmark further suggest that the combination of these two 
rates, will be able to alleviate any economic volatility and create nearly riskless growth.  
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The idea of a two-rate system is appealing as it essentially separates the interbank 
lending aspect of the current LIBOR from the securitization aspect. To increase efficiency, 
regulators could focus their efforts within the market where there is more securitization. With 
the Federal Reserve continuing to limit their oversight regarding the financial practices 
associated with these benchmarks, perhaps, minimizing their responsibility and the size of the 
market they would have to monitor would create an incentive for them to increase institutional 
control. The “risk free” benchmark rate creates a clear market where all the risky securities are 
pooled, making it easier for the Fed to monitor. If there is a period of instability, the effects 
would not impact the interbank lending market directly and with increased regulation there is a 
possibility a crisis could be quelled before it completely crashes the system. The two-rate 
proposal would also guard against the possibility of a capital market failure, as the LIBOR 
would still essentially exist but only as a benchmark for interbank lending. The contracts banks 
have tied to risky securities would be transitioned over to a new, underlying market. 
Fluctuations in the valuations of securities contracts would most likely still occur but supporters 
of this proposal argue that these fluctuations would be less volatile than if the market was 
completely transferred over to the current proposed version of the SOFR.  
SOFR is Provides Better Stability than the Two Rate System:   
Given the above analysis, switching to the two-rate system seems like a more viable 
option for the Federal Reserve to consider but there is absolutely no reason to keep a version of 
the LIBOR around, in any form. Member banks hardly use the LIBOR for its function as an 
index for interbank lending which has caused this market to essentially stagnant. In other words, 
the current version of the LIBOR reflects a market that no longer exists, where rate submissions 
consist largely of estimates rather than real market data. The only function the LIBOR serves 
now is for monitoring various securities contracts that member banks still have pegged to the 
benchmark. It cannot adequately function in this role as evident by the manipulation scandal that 
occurred which caused the decline of this rate. The strongest policy implication that proponents 
of the two-rate system present is associated with the theory that the spread of current LIBOR 
contracts might increase dramatically when the transition finally occurs.  This would cause 
valuations for contracts to fluctuate immensely, increasing economic volatility within global 
markets. However, valuations are going to fluctuate regardless of the new system the Federal 
Reserve decides to adopt. The only situation where valuations of these securities would not 
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fluctuate is if the Federal Reserve decided to preserve the current LIBOR benchmark, which is 
already in the nascent stages of being phased out, as, come January 2022, member banks will no 
longer need to feed daily numbers for the LIBOR calculation (Stafford 2021). If banks include 
contingency clauses that account for this switch, the transition should progress with ease. 
Ultimately, the two-rate system is not a feasible alternative to the SOFR as it relies too much on 
remnants of the LIBOR.  It makes more sense to transition the market to a new benchmark rate 
instead of recycling the properties of one that is associated with scandal and cannot accurately 
report the financial activities that are occurring by its member banks. SOFR utilizes a better 
system along with a tougher monitoring regime and does not carry the negative economic 
connotation that is often associated with the LIBOR. 
To ensure the most efficient transition, the Federal Reserve delayed the switch to the 
SOFR to 2023, as the COVID-19 pandemic caused an unprecedented recessionary period which 
would have created massive fluctuations in LIBOR tied securities, if they were moved to the 
SOFR, during this economic slowdown. Essentially, by delaying this transition, the Federal 
Reserve was ensuring that capital markets maintained their stability. With the introduction of 
the vaccine, the United States economy should be able to recover from this recessionary period 
and create a relatively stable transitionary period. Moreover, any long-term LIBOR contracts 
that were set to transfer over to the SOFR in 2021 have more time to possibly run out before the 
new 2023 transition. This would allow for less volatility as there might be less long-term 
contracts to transfer to the SOFR. Regulators are making it emphasis to force firms to conform 
to the new SOFR tied market. Hopefully, banks are following the Federal Reserve’s mandates 
and preparing their balance sheets for the switch. It is in the banks own self-interest to limit their 
long-term exposure within the LIBOR benchmark, as they run risk of experiencing massive 
losses in the event, they ignore the Feds mandate.  
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the regulatory agency that oversees the 
global benchmarks, stated that reporting based on LIBOR would be phased out at the end of 
2021 for certain currencies, such as, Sterling, Euro, Swiss franc and Japanese yen. One-week 
and two-month US dollar reports will also be phased out at the same time. With these currencies 
moving out of the LIBOR market, global authorities have pushed member banks and investors 
to stop using the rate completely and temporarily utilize benchmarks based on overnight rates. 
In response to regulatory agencies request, financial participants state that the sudden transition 
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away from US dollar LIBOR could potentially jeopardize financial stability. Again, the best 
solution to quell these concerns is for financial participants to establish  “fallback language” to 
assign a new benchmark rate to contracts that currently reference LIBOR. In other words, “new 
contracts entered into before December 31, 2021 should either utilize a reference rate other than 
LIBOR or have robust fallback language that includes a clearly defined alternative reference 
rate after Libor’s discontinuation” (Rennison and Smith 2020). Due to the delay of the 
transition, the safest option for banks, investors, and risk managers is to avoid long term LIBOR 
contracts. After the transition is complete, these financial participants can go back to a more 
normalized structure of benchmark tied investments.  
 The current transitory period still gives banks until June 2023 “to extricate themselves 
from $200tn of US dollar contracts tied to the benchmark” (Stafford 2021).  Hopefully, the 
phasing out of various major currencies in terms of the LIBOR benchmark will deter institutions 
from entering any new LIBOR tied financial contracts. At the same time, member banks should 
continue to attempt to shed any positions that could expose them financially when the transition 
is complete. The issue plaguing U.S. markets in this transition is the switch to SOFR has been 
slower than other countries switch to their alternative benchmark, mostly due to the fact the 
SOFR is a new and unique rate, not an existing one (Rennison and Smith 2020). However, if the 
Federal Reserve and SEC hold banks accountable for their risk exposures within the current 
LIBOR benchmark, the deliberate nature of the USD phase out will not cause any financial 
incoherence. In order to ensure banks are being safe with their positions that are pegged to the 
LIBOR, the Federal Reserve should emphasize transparency. If the Federal Reserve can monitor 
the U.S. member banks positions, they can be better prepared for the economic effects that the 
SOFR transition will cause in capital markets. Moreover, any risky long-term positions that 
banks have can be dealt with before the LIBOR is phased out.  
LIBOR supporters want to keep the benchmark rate around because they claim that with 
new regulations and harsher penalties for fraudulent behavior, the speculative behavior by 
economic agents can be halted. However, they continuously gloss over the fact that the LIBOR 
is an out-of-date mechanism, that cannot effectively act as a benchmark within financial 
markets. With that being said, monitoring a pool of risky assets is no small feat and there are 
significant concerns regarding the SOFR’s ability to prevent further capital market 
incoherence.   
 40 
Moving towards the Transition:  
 The Federal Reserve is adamant that the SOFR possesses a better regulatory impact than 
the LIBOR. One of their main points is that the SOFR’s underlying market (Treasury GC repo 
market) is safer than the prior system. However, the idea that Treasury GC repo transactions 
provide a measure of safety is extremely misguided. These assets also have a history of being 
fixed, as seen in the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) bankruptcy . LTCM, in order to 
maximize short term returns, would manipulate the benchmarks by considering the underlying 
Treasury bonds will be more liquid than bonds of similar but shorter maturities that were issued 
in prior periods. The newly issued benchmarks often traded more expensively than the less 
liquid older bonds, but this condition had only limited duration.  New benchmarks issued by the 
Treasury would shift trading away from the old benchmark and move it to the more recently 
created security. Traders would focus their transactions within these benchmark bonds, by 
strategically purchasing the old benchmark, which no longer had a significant premium, and 
then consequently open a short position on the newly issued benchmark (Sungard 2006). Over 
time, the valuations of the two bonds would converge, as the value of the previously new 
benchmark faded once a more current benchmark was issued, hence allowing them to influence 
the market.  
The speculative positions of LTCM almost crashed the entire financial system, as this 
fund related to many large financial institutions. Ultimately, the traders at LTCM did not 
consider that if the financial participants within the market shifted their preferences towards 
more liquidity, it would cause these positions to require increasing liquidity to be maintained. 
Specifically, within U.S markets, many investors shifted their investments into the most liquid 
parts of the U.S. Treasury market, which were the most recently issued securities that LTCM 
had sold short. Moreover, the spreads between the yields of the old benchmarks and the newly 
issued ones widened significantly (Sungard 2006). As a result, liquidity became more valuable 
causing their short positions to increase in price relative to their long positions, essentially 
creating a massive, unhedged exposure within their balance sheet. The crisis with LTCM should 
remind financial participants that any asset market is subject to instability. Essentially, any 
market that has benchmarks backed by securities is essentially subject to risk, as all aspects of 
the market have the potential to be traded for profit by financial institutions. This is just one of 
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the many reasons the Federal Reserve needs to reevaluate whether the SOFR will provide the 
adequate financial protection desired to stabilize financial markets.  
With the Biden Administration taking power, the newly appointed SEC chief Gary 
Gensler, is set to install “new discipline and rules for governing the multi-trillion-dollar 
derivatives market, including reintroducing the 2010 Dodd Frank regulatory reforms enacted in 
response to the 2008 financial crisis (Moyer 2021). The law also provides new litigation 
regarding company liquidations or restructurings. This aspect of the legislation was established 
to assist with the dismantling of shadow financial companies and prevent tax dollars from being 
used to prop up these types of firms (Moyer 2021). More importantly, this allows for regulatory 
authorities to break up banks that have grown too large and force them to increase their reserve 
requirements. The Dodd Frank laws also enact regulations on credit rating agencies who were 
accused of contributing to the financial crisis by giving out misleading favorable credit 
ratings.  Now there is an office that is charged with ensuring rating agencies report accurate and 
reliable credit ratings of the entities they are tasked with evaluating. The Biden administration's 
emphasis on bringing back the Dodd Frank reforms means that there will be better financial 
oversight within capital markets. Hence, it makes the most sense to let the securities such as 
derivatives and futures to be traded within the wider-known market and subject the banks who 
choose to deal with these speculative deals to face regulation from the Federal Government and 
Federal Reserve. Moving these speculative transactions to the lesser known SOFR benchmark 
could give banks the regulatory arbitrage they need to be financially irresponsible again and 
cause economic instability to spread throughout the system. It is important for regulatory 
authorities to consider the possibility that the SOFR could be a vessel that financial institutions 
utilize in order subvert financial regulation. Therefore, it is imperative that both the Federal 
Reserve and the Federal Government monitor the market within the SOFR benchmark and hold 
banks accountable to the Dodd Frank reforms that are being instituted.   
 A better option the Federal Reserve should consider is to eliminate benchmark rates for 
capital markets. The reality is with the decline of the interbank lending market, which was the 
main catalyst behind the creation of the LIBOR, there is no longer any role for these benchmark 
rates. Recall that the LIBOR was created in response to the rise of the Eurodollar market which 
became known for its unregulated nature. Hence, when securitization within global markets 
increased, the Eurodollar market became an ideal place to trade high risk securities. With 
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LIBORs’ original function essentially nullified, there is absolutely no need to keep it around or 
a benchmark rate like it, such as the SOFR. Simply put, the Federal Reserve along with the 
Federal Government should just monitor the different transactions that would have been tied to 
a benchmark rate. By consolidating regulatory agencies within the market, Federal authorities 
could create an efficient system that would have the ability to prevent significant market 
instability. Under the current system, the Federal Government along with the Federal Reserve 
have created many sub-regulatory organizations that all preform different functions. The various 
agencies often make regulation convoluted and difficult to achieve. Streamlining these agencies 
and taking people from each regulatory authority to create an independent organization that 
could monitor the securities that are traded under the LIBOR benchmark would reinforce 
financial stability more effectively than the SOFR.  However, regulatory participants would 
have to be carefully vetted to make sure they have no direct ties to any of the financial 
institutions. This is imperative to keep the integrity of organization, so it does not manipulate 
the market to benefit the banks they are supposed to be regulating. The securities that are traded 
within these financial spaces would be just pegged to the overarching market. Even if the 
Federal Reserve did not want to eliminate benchmarks completely, this independent 
organization could essentially set the benchmark for the market. Leaving implementation of 
SOFR to private institutions gives market participants incentive to collude and manipulate. 
Creating an unbiased organization lessens the chances of a crisis like the LIBOR Fixing Scandal 
from occurring again.    
 There is a precedent for the use of autonomous organizations to regulate financial 
markets. As a response to the LIBOR fixing scandal, economic reforms established independent 
clearing houses for derivative transactions to occur. The independent nature of these clearing 
houses ensure that no arm’s length transactions could take place, eliminating any collusion 
between financial institutions. Therefore, it is completely viable for the Federal Reserve and the 
Federal Government to create an autonomous organization to monitor all transactions that 
would be pegged to a benchmark rate. This organization would also be able to set the 
benchmark for the market and function as its main monitoring regime. In this scenario, there are 
no underlying assets to peg these securities to, which will decrease the risk of benchmark fixing. 
Moreover, forming this type of independent organization is not as convoluted as policy makers 
argue as it already exists within the U.S. economy in its role as the main monetary authority. In 
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other words, the Federal Reserve could perform the necessary functions to monitor these trades 
that are set to be pegged to the SOFR. Prior to the switch to open market operations, the Federal 
Reserve utilized the discount window in which it set the benchmark rate for lending reserves to 
its member banks. This process allowed them to monitor these institutions balance sheets and 
gave them the ability to be involved in all daily bank transactions. A similar process could be 
utilized to monitor the securities that are set to be pegged to the SOFR. Simply put, the Federal 
Reserve could set the benchmark and monitor the deals banks undertake that are pegged to this 
rate. The autonomy of the Federal Reserve as regulator would remove any chance of collusion 
that could take place between banks and financial authorities. In addition, the benchmark itself 
will be supported by the power of the Federal Reserve, so no underlying assets will be needed to 
back it, unlike the SOFR.  Under this proposed system the Fed as well its constituents can 
anticipate any financial instability related to this benchmark and, hence, can quell any economic 
incoherence before it cripples the entire system.    
Conclusion:  
Regardless of the positions of different analysts regarding this transition, neither the 
SOFR nor the reformed USD LIBOR will be effective in bringing financial stability to capital 
markets if the Federal Government and the Federal Reserve do not increase their financial 
oversight on the institutions that operate within these markets. During the manipulation scandal 
the informal nature of the LIBOR reporting process created an incentive for banks to undertake 
speculative activities that created incoherence within the markets. If these laissez faire 
conditions remain intact, it is irrelevant to transition the benchmark system. Regardless of what 
benchmark is used, laissez-faire conditions will eventually cause instability. With reinstitution 
of the Dodd Frank reforms, it should be harder for financial institutions to undertake speculative 
activities to increase their profit margins. Moreover, these reforms should, hopefully, prevent 
any misreporting that banks have done in the past to cover the fact they were losing money on 
these risky transactions. However, just because these reforms are being reinstituted does not 
mean the Federal Reserve and the Federal Government can let the SOFR benchmark self-
regulate itself for numerous reasons. First, it is unclear how the SOFR will act in times of 
recession and indicators say it will have different effects than the LIBOR. If there is another 
economic recession volatility for securities tied to the SOFR could increase, causing widespread 
market incoherence. Second, it is unclear how efficient the transition will be, as many financial 
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participants are wary about the value of their existing LIBOR contracts. It is still difficult to 
project whether banks will suffer losses on long-term contracts once the USD LIBOR is 
completely phased out. Lastly, it is a cause for concern that the United States is behind other 
countries in phasing out USD for the LIBOR. If this is not done in a timely manner, the 
transition might not go as smoothly as the Federal Reserve is anticipating, leading to capital 
market failures.  
In the end, due to the unstable nature of capitalism and the power of money, it is only 
natural for the economy to divert from a position of stability. Hence, an economic approach with 
more regulation needs to be adopted in order to extinguish the incoherent nature of capitalism 
and ensure economic prosperity. The orthodox assumptions that argue lenders will never lend to 
unqualified borrowers and all borrowers will eventually pay their debts can no longer be 
assumed when monitoring the SOFR rate.   
There is still much uncertainty regarding the economic effects this switch will have on 
both U.S markets and global markets.  In the short run, banks and investors will see slight 
valuation differences in their formerly tied LIBOR contracts. However, if they include robust 
fallback language detailing the conditions of the rate change in these contracts, the transition 
will go smoothly with limited long-term affects. The biggest long-term risk to the SOFR 
benchmark is if Federal and private authorities get complacent in their monitoring methods.  If 
the transactions related to this new benchmark to go unregulated, similar financial instability to 
the LIBOR scandal will arise. Ultimately, there are still better options that the Federal Reserve 
could explore to make the benchmark system even safer, and it would be in the best interest of 
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